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Abstract-Mobile IP communication, like wired communication 
and mobile ad hoc networking, is vulnerable to Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks. In this paper, we propose using a 
lightweight packet filtering technique in different domains and 
base stations to reduce/eliminate the threat of DoS attacks on 
mobile IP networks. The proposed technique will be able to 
detect and filter out any suspected packets containing spoofed 
IP address created by DoS attackers. The results of our 
experiments indicate that our proposed technique can 
significantly reduce the effect of DoS attacks and improves 
performance of mobile IP communication. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquitous nature of mobile computing, brought by 
the proliferation of mobile phones and wireless networks, is 
being felt in all spheres of our lives. Users nowadays want 
to be always connected and they require computing devices 
such as laptops, PDAs and smart phones to be connected to 
the Internet. Business users are relying more on wireless 
networks due to the lower infrastructure costs and the 
flexibility it brings to employees. While mobile users can 
easily stay connected through the Internet, the mobile 
workforce requires more reliable and secure connectivity to 
the office network.  
Mobile IP [1] was introduced to provide seamless and 
transparent network connectivity while the user is 
physically moving between network access points or base 
stations. Since mobile IP is an extension of the IP protocol, 
it has the same robustness and scalability of the protocol. 
However, mobile IP is also vulnerable to security exploits 
affecting the wired Internet as well as some new exploits in 
a mobile environment.  
This paper aims to solve one of the main problems 
currently faced by businesses, namely denial of service 
(DoS) attacks on their organizational resources. DoS attacks 
are an ongoing issue in fixed networks and a lot of work has 
been done for preventing or mitigating this attack in wired 
communication. A fuzzy-based inference mechanism is used 
to infer a soft boundary between anomalous and normal 
behaviors using multiple detection engines [17]. 
DoS prevention and mitigation is now a very important 
issue in mobile communication as mobile devices have 
much lower resources, both in terms of bandwidth and 
processing power, compared to fixed network devices. A 
DoS attack will temporarily cause the mobile user to lose 
connectivity to the network, thus reducing productivity and 
possible loss of revenue. For example, a mobile sales force 
that is unable to access the organization sales server will not 
be able to complete a sale. This problem is further 
exacerbated in small and medium enterprises (SME) since 
they lack the resources to quickly recover from a DoS 
attack. As this is such an important problem, we have 
designed a better solution for detecting and preventing DoS 
attack in Mobile IP communication.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents a brief overview of mobile IP, DoS attack scenarios 
and existing research on mitigating these DoS attacks in 
mobile communications. Section III provides a detail design 
of our proposed solution. Section IV presents simulation 
analysis of the proposed solution. Section V concludes this 
paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Mobile IP Architecture 
Mobile IP is an open standard supporting data 
transmission in a mobile network using the IP protocol. It 
allows a mobile node to seamlessly continue receiving data 
when the node changes its point of attachment to the 
Internet. For this purpose, some additional components and 
control messages are required as explained below. 
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Mobile Node (MN): A network host that can change its 
point of attachment from one network to another without 
changing its home IP address. 
Corresponding Node (CN): A network host that 
communicates with a mobile node over the Internet. This 
node can be either fixed or mobile. 
Home IP Address: A globally unique IP address that is 
used to identify a mobile node over the Internet. This 
address does not change during the communication session 
with a CN. 
Care-of-Address (CoA): A temporary IP address given to 
a mobile node while it is connected to a foreign network.   
Home Agent (HA): An agent located in the mobile node’s 
home network that maintains the mobile node’s current 
location information and tunnels any packets that are 
addressed to the mobile node (Home IP address) to its 
current location on the network (CoA). 
Foreign Agent (FA): An agent that provides a care-of-
address to the mobile node in a foreign network. The FA is 
the end point of the tunnel between the home agent and the 
mobile node and will deliver the tunneled packets from the 
corresponding node to the mobile node in a foreign 
network.  
Mobile IP not only maintains session continuity for 
network applications by retaining its home IP address, but 
also presents a consistent IP address to others so that users 
are constantly reachable by applications. The operations of 
Mobile IP are provided in [1].  
 
B. DoS Attack Scenarios in Mobile IP Networks 
Mobile IP raises some new security issues and 
vulnerabilities, particularly from attacks that deny the user 
from accessing network resources (denial of service). This 
is due to the fact that the communicating device is mobile 
and must transmit/receive data from one network point to 
another.  
A DoS attack [2, 3] is any event that diminishes a 
network’s capacity to perform its expected function. These 
attacks are launched against server resources or network 
bandwidth by preventing authorized users from accessing 
resources. They pose threats to larger websites such as 
Amazon and eBay. The effect of these attacks varies from 
temporarily blocking service availability to permanently 
distorting information in the network. DoS attacks can 
target a client computer or a server computer. For example, 
an attack may target a system by exhausting limited mobile 
node resources such as wireless bandwidth, storage space, 
battery power, CPU, or system memory. Networks and 
applications can be attacked by modifying routing 
information or changing system configuration, thereby 
directly attacking data integrity. 
The most common type of DoS attack occurs when 
adversaries flood a large amount of bogus data to interfere 
or disrupt the service on the server [4]. A DoS attack takes 
one of the two forms: (a) An attacker floods nuisance 
packets (e.g. TCP SYN flooding) or (b) an attacker 
somehow precludes packets from flowing between two 
nodes.  
This attack prevents or inhibits the normal use or 
management of communication facilities. This attack may 
have a specific target; for example, an entity may suppress 
all messages directed to a particular destination (e.g. the 
security audit service). Another form of service denial is the 
disruption of an entire network, either by disabling the 
network or by overloading it with messages so as to degrade 
performance. 
In the case of Mobile IP, when an attacker manages a 
bogus registration of a new CoA for a legitimate mobile 
node or generates a bogus registration request specifying its 
own IP address as the CoA for a mobile node, a DoS attack 
can occur. This can lead to disconnection of the legitimate 
mobile node from the network and unauthorized snooping 
of all traffic to the mobile node by the attacker.  
An attacker can overflow the access server by launching a 
flooding attack. It is possible because the IP addresses of the 
HA and the MN are not hidden in the registration message. 
An example of such an attack is TCP/IP SYN attack [5]. 
This attack typically attempts to flood a target with traffic to 
waste network bandwidth or server resources. The DoS 
attacks that target resources can be grouped into three broad 
scenarios.  
The first attack scenario targets storage and processing 
resources. This is an attack that mainly targets the memory, 
storage space, or CPU of the service provider. Consider the 
case where an attacker continuously sends an executable 
flooding packet to its neighborhoods to overload the storage 
space and exhaust the memory of those nodes. This prevents 
the nodes from sending or receiving packets from other 
legitimate nodes.  
The second attack scenario targets energy resources, 
specifically the battery power of the service provider. Since 
mobile devices operate by battery power, energy is an 
important resource in mobile IP communication. An 
attacker may continuously send a bogus packet to a node 
with the intention of consuming the victim’s battery energy 
and preventing other nodes from communicating with the 
node.  
The third attack scenario targets bandwidth. Consider the 
case where an attacker located between multiple 
communicating nodes wants to waste the network 
bandwidth and disrupt connectivity. The malicious node can 
continuously send packets with spoofed IP addresses, 
thereby overloading the network. This consumes the 
resources of all neighbors that receive the packets, thus 
overloading the network, which results in performance 
degradations.  
Firewall offers some level of protection, in that they can 
be programmed to drop all packets from a known attacking 
host, but it’s easy for the attacker to simply put a different 
source IP address in each packet by using IP spoofing 
technique. We need to apply some filtering technique to 
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identify and filter the suspected or unwanted packets which 
contains spoofed IP addresses. 
An attacker can also make use of other network devices 
(zombies) to launch an attack. This version of DoS attack is 
called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack and is 
more severe than a DoS attack. In a DDoS attack, an 
attacker launches an attack upon the target victim in a 
coordinated fashion.  
A combination of different DoS and DDoS attack 
scenarios is shown in figure 1, reproduced from [2]. Here 
routers, attackers, victims, domains and hosts are denoted 
by R, A, V, D and H respectively. The attacker A1 launches 
an attack on the victim V. A1 spoofs IP address of host H5 
from domain D5. Another attacker A3 uses hosts H3 as a 
reflector to attack V. 
 
C. Methods to Prevent DoS Attacks in Mobile IP Networks 
Mobile IP raises new security issues for wireless network 
and there is comparatively higher probability (compared 
with wired network) of being attacked by hostile opponents. 
 T. Braun and M. Danzeisen [6] proposed a solution to 
provide security to Mobile IP using IP Sec and called it 
Secure Mobile IP (SecMIP). J. Zao and M. Condel [16] 
used IP Sec ESP protocol in Mobile IP to protect against 
both passive and active attacks. MIP-IPSec tunnel is 
established between MN-HA, HA-FA and FA-MN to fulfill 
the security requirements. V. Gupta and G. Montenegro [8] 
proposed some enhancements to basic Mobile IP protocol so 
that authorized users can access network that is protected by 
firewalls or some combinations of source filtering routers or 
the network, which are using private address space for 
security reasons. A. Inoue, M. Ishiyama, A. Fukumoto and 
T. Okamoto [9] proposed to modify Mobile IP protocol with 
IP Sec and called it Secure Mobile IP protocol. Here secure 
Mobile IP is implemented on gateway servers and mobile 
hosts. A new protocol for securing binding update messages 
of mobile IP communication has been proposed by 
employing key cryptosystems that is digital signature and 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [10].  
DoS and DDoS attacks were classified in [7]. These 
attacks pose unpredictable threats to the Internet 
infrastructure and Internet-based business [11]. Some 
methods to prevent DoS attacks in Mobile IP 
communication have been proposed but they did not show 
any performance evaluation as well as consider any DDoS 
attacks [12]. Denko et al. [5] proposed a DoS attack 
prevention scheme in mobile ad hoc network’s using 
reputation based incentive scheme. Anderson et al. [13] 
proposed TVA system, Packet Passport system and StopIt 
system for limiting DoS attack in wired communication. 
DDoS Attack Traceback and Mitigation System (DATMS) 
are proposed to trace the DDoS attack sources based on 
network performance monitoring [14]. A packet filter 
controller which adapts to queue length is proposed to 
mitigate the DDoS attack in this paper. The work on 
preventing DoS attacks in mobile devices using Mobile IP is 
very limited and a new approach is proposed in this paper 
for use in mobile networks. 
 
III. DESIGN OF PROPOSED SOLUTION  
When a network becomes highly dynamic, it becomes too 
complex to detect and prevent DoS attack. So, an acceptable 
approach is to divide a large network into small and 
manageable groups and implement security mechanisms in 
each group in a distributed manner.  We propose to divide a 
large network into some hierarchical structures. Firstly, we 
will divide the network into domains. Then, each domain 
can be divided into clusters which consist of one or more 
wired or mobile node or base station. We argue that, if we 
can manage and secure each cluster efficiently, we can 
secure each domain and thus the whole network becomes 
secured and manageable. This is basically a distributed 
approach where each domain or cluster is independent. 
Figure 2 in [12] shows our proposed domain-based 
clustering architecture. 
We present the following advantages for hierarchical 
structures. First, this approach is scalable. The performance 
of the security mechanisms would not degrade when the 
network scales. Second, each cluster can be controlled 
Fig. 1. Different scenarios for DoS attacks 
 
Fig. 2. Clustering Architecture of mobile IP communication.
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independently. That means, the security mechanisms in a 
cluster lying in the more dynamic portion of a large network 
may not match with that of a cluster lying in a comparative 
static portion. Third, detecting an attacker becomes easier in 
a clustered architecture as it provides localized information. 
Fourth, this localized and distributed feature reduces 
storage, processing and communication overhead, thereby 
optimizing network bandwidth utilization. 
After dividing a large network into hierarchical structure 
we propose two techniques, (i) Filtering in Domain Base 
Station Router, and (ii) Queue Monitoring in Base Station 
Node. Each of these techniques is described in details 
below. 
 
A. Filtering in Domain Base Station Router 
In each domain there is an edge or periphery router 
through which each packet within the domain has to pass 
through to get to another domain. We propose to filter the 
malicious packets in each domain’s periphery router before 
the packets are sent to the mobile node. This approach uses 
ingress/egress filtering to stop DoS attacks from entering or 
leaving a domain.  
Basically foreign agents act as the periphery router in a 
domain. When a mobile node is visiting a foreign network 
and registers with the FA, the FA will keep track of the 
addresses associated with that mobile node using a caching 
mechanism. After registration, if the mobile node wants to 
attack any node outside its current domain by spoofing the 
source address, the domain periphery router will detect and 
filter that packet as the spoofed address is unknown to itself. 
If the FA receives a packet for the MN with a source 
address different than the tunneled HA address, it will filter 
that packet as it assumes it is a DoS attack. 
Although caching requires some memory in the domain 
periphery router, we argue that, it would not be a 
performance issues because for each node very small 
memory would be needed. 
 
B.  Queue Monitoring in Base Station Node 
Our second proposition is to protect the HA from 
forwarding DoS attacks to the MN. If the HA is under DoS 
attack, it will be overloaded by attacking packets. Most of 
the HA resources will be consumed by the fake packets. As 
a result, legitimate nodes will be barred from 
communicating with the MN. In this situation, we propose 
to monitor the queue and set its size in an adaptive manner. 
We propose to limit the queue size in case of sudden 
increase of tiny packets (like TCP SYN packets) in the 
queue. This is because sudden increase of such packets 
raises the probability of a DoS attack. So, dropping packets 
in this case would reduce the effect of the attack.  
We propose to measure the queue in the basis of small 
(near to size of TCP SYN packets) packets at the HA 
regularly. Once this value goes over a predefined level, the 
queue size would be limited by an adaptive value 
considering other bigger size packets in the queue. This 
indicates that we only want to filter the suspicious packets, 
not any one of the data packets. This is important as the FA 
will not filter out packets from HA. Thus eliminating 
suspicious packets at the HA will prevent DoS attacks at the 
foreign network.   
The problem with this approach is, some applications use 
small packets, which may also be dropped in this filtering. 
To save these packets we propose to drop packets in the 
event of sudden and large increases of small packets in the 
queue. We argue that, the applications that use small 
packets do not send packets at a very high rate. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. Simulation Environment 
We created Mobile IP simulation environments in ns-2 
[15]. We created a wired-cum-wireless topology through 
which we can exchange packets between a wired and 
wireless domain via a base-station. We make the following 
assumptions for the simplicity of simulation:  
(a) Each mobile node in the network has a unique ID and 
can join or leave the network freely. 
(b) Each packet is of equal size, although packet may vary 
in size according to their contained data.  Packet sending 
rates are also constant. 
(c) Initially, all nodes have equal computational and 
storage capability. 
 
B. Scenario 1: Filtering in the queue of Home Agent 
As said earlier, filtering in the queue of the HA can 
significantly reduce the effect of DoS attack. For example, 
in case of TCP SYN flooding attack, an attacking node 
starts the three way handshaking phase, but does not 
complete the phase.  The size of the packets in handshaking 
phase is very small. However, the HA will observe a sudden 
increase of TCP SYN packets in its queue.  
In figure 3, we simulate four malicious nodes 
simultaneously attacking a mobile node under the base 
station which is its home agent. We used constant bit rate 
(CBR) applications to simulate TCP SYN flooding attack 
 
Fig. 3. Monitoring queue in the HA 
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where packet size is 40 bytes. The parameters used in this 
simulation is shown in table 1. In ns-2 there are many 
parameters to express the status of a queue such as queue 
size in bytes, queue size in no. of packets, the entrance and 
departure of packets etc.  
In our approach, we filter the queue in the HA by limiting 
the queue size to four and observe the effects of queue size 
on DoS attacks. In this simulation, we dropped 63 TCP 
SYN packets and thus the effect of the attack is reduced at 
the HA node.  
 In figure 4, we observed some high fluctuations in queue 
size (measured in no. of packets). The peak values indicate 
the sudden presence of huge no. of small packets which is a 
sign of DDoS attack. The peak values rose close to 15 in 
this figure. 
In figure 5, we observed the queue status while it is being 
filtered by limiting the queue size to an adaptive value, in 
our case it was set to 4. Limiting the queue size results in 
some packets drops which were certainly used for DDoS 
attack here. In this simulation we found by analyzing the 
trace file of the simulation that 63 malicious packets were 
dropped using this filtering technique 
 
C. Scenario-2: Filtering in Domain Base Station Router  
In figure 6, there is a wired domain consisting of two 
wired nodes in two clusters with hierarchical addresses 
0.0.0 and 0.1.0 respectively. Home Agent (HA) and Foreign 
Agent (FA) are two base station nodes in two other different 
domains. There are five roaming mobile nodes (MN) 
marked as green, which move between their home agent and 
foreign agent. There are five TCP flows from each of these 
five nodes where a node in the wired domain of address 
0.0.0 is the destination for all. As the five sources move out 
from the domain the HA to the domain of FA, the packets 
destined for the wired node is redirected by its HA to the 
FA as per Mobile IP protocol definitions.  
When the five MN reach the FA, they first get registered. 
In our simulation scenario some of the sources become 
malicious (marked as red) and use spoofed addresses to 
attack the wired node. 
In our proposed solution, we cache the addresses of each 
node at the FA and when the MNs start using spoofed IP 
addresses, those packets from unknown sources are dropped 
at the FA. Although this mechanism consumes some 
memory of the FA, it can significantly reduce the DoS 
attack in the very early stage. 
We use the simulation parameter described in table 2 for 
scenario 2 and compare result between filtering and without 
filtering techniques. In figure 7, a comparison is shown with 
and without this filtering technique applied. We observe 
that, after the filtering technique is applied, the number of 
packets forwarded by the FA is reduced significantly. This 
is because the packets sent by the MNs with spoofed 
addresses are identified and dropped. Here it is noticeable 
that, using this filtering technique, packets will be dropped 
proportionally with the increase or decrease with the 
number of attacking nodes. 
TABLE I 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR SCENARIO 1 
Parameters Values/Ranges 
Packet Size 40 Bytes 






Simulation Time 60 s 
 
Fig. 4. Queue status of base station while being attacked 
 
Fig. 5. Queue status at base station while being filtered 
 
 
Fig. 6. Simulation with filtering in the domain periphery router 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
Denial of service attacks in mobile IP communication is 
now considered as one of the most severe attacks. The 
detection and prevention of these attacks is more difficult in 
case of mobile IP communication than in their wired 
counterparts as the node is not fixed to a particular network. 
In this paper, we proposed a technique for detecting and 
preventing DoS attacks in mobile IP communication. We 
proposed to apply a filtering and queue monitoring 
technique at the vulnerable points of the mobile IP 
communication, namely the foreign agent (FA) and home 
agent (HA). We observed that our proposed architecture can 
reduce the effect of DoS and DDoS significantly. We intend 
to test the use of our techniques against other types of DDoS 
attacks in future work.   
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TABLE II 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR SCENARIO 2 
Parameters Values/Ranges 
Speed of mobile 
nodes 
20 m/s 
Packet Size 1000 Bytes 
Transport agent TCP 
Application FTP 
Node Numbers  100 
Domain Numbers 4 - 5 
Number of Clusters 5 - 10 
Simulation Time 60 s  
Fig. 7. Comparison of packet passing, with and without filtering 
technique applied 
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